177 fled the capital before its fall, and the Western
579 soldiers plundered and looted the city far more
728 devastatingly than they had forty years earlier.
648 Tientsin had suffered a like visitation a month earlier. The further cost to China of the Boxer Rebellion included the payment of an indemnity to the offended nations -- the United States' share being later converted into a scholarship fund for Chinese students to study in America -- and the stationing of foreign troops in Peking with the right to police the area from the capital to the sea. Foreign garrisons continued to exercise these rights until forced out of the capital by the Chinese Communists.

E. Government by Military Force

642 The example of Japan's defeat of Russia
669 following on China's humiliation as a consequence of the Boxer Rebellion swelled reform sentiment throughout the nation. By 1911, a national assembly was sitting in Peking. Although constituted by the throne to assure the conservative nature of the advisory body, it was proving more progressive minded than the dynasty and more demanding than advisory. Before the real intentions of the dynasty were put to the test, revolution broke out along the Yangtze River and immediately spread to the South. Very little sympathetic response came

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642 669 from Hopei and Shansi.[19]

The most powerful and modern military force in China at the time, the Pei-yang Army, remained loyal to the throne. The staff officers of the army were even more loyal to Yüan Shih-k'ai, who had organized and trained the force while governor of Hopei. Called out of enforced retirement to save the Manchu Dynasty, he used the Pei-yang Army to contain the revolutionary forces. At the same time, Yüan advanced his own ambitions as negotiator for the ruling house with the revolutionaries. An agreement was finally 642 reached in February 1912 by which the Manchus abdicated the throne and transferred the central governing power to Yüan. He was able to win the approval of the republican leader, Sun Yat-sen, who persuaded the provisional assembly convened at Nanking to elect Yüan president of the Republic of China with its capital at Nanking.

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19. On the nature and progress of the 1911 Revolution see Fairbank and Teng, op. cit., pp. 193-229 and passim; and H. F. MacNair, China in Revolution: An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic, Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1931, pp. 1-45.

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C. Victory of the Communist Party

701 At the end of the war, Communist forces
668 were scattered throughout the North China Region.
631 With few exceptions, the Communists were in command wherever the authority of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Government reached. Other border region governments unrecognized by Chungking had been established by the Communists at the juncture of Shansi-Suiyuan, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning, Shansi-Hopei-Honan, and Hopei-Shantung-Honan. The countryside surrounding these bases was largely under the supervision of roving guerrilla units of the Eighth Route Army.

668 After the surrender of Japan, the
669 Communists' design to solidify their control over the entire North China Region by accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in the major cities was thwarted by the Kuomintang. Yen Hsi-shan seized Taiyuan, and American air and naval transport facilities ferried National Government forces to the major cities of North China before the Communists reached them on foot. The only important city in the North occupied and held by the Communists for a time was Kalgan (Chang-chia-k'ou) along the Great Wall in northern Hopei. Through this key rail junction the Communists were able to funnel troops into Manchuria, where Soviet Union occupation enabled them to take

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668 669 Japanese arms and ammunition and occupy most of the region.[32]

In the civil war that almost immediately followed the defeat of Japan, the Communists in North China concentrated on holding actions and the disruption of rail communications. These tactics not only handicapped the Nationalist Government in supplying its troops in Manchuria, where the main struggle in the civil war was being fought, but also helped to cripple the national economy south of the Yellow River.

After Manchuria had been won by the Communist forces in early November 1938, they were regrouped as the Fourth Field Army and funnelled into Hopei by way of the coastal pass at Shan-hai-kuan. Reinforced by troops from North China, the Fourth Field Army launched a full-scale offensive in the Peking-Tientsin-Kalgan triangle in December. Tientsin fell on January 15, 1949. The Nationalist army in

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32. The names, dates, and campaigns, connected with the Communist victory are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to these facts in so far as can be determined by checking other, scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954, pp. 36-38, 50-54, 60-64, 89-92, 104-105.

668 669 Peking under the command of Fu Tso-i accepted Communist surrender terms and withdrew from the city on January 22, permitting the Red Army to enter the capital in a triumphal march on January 31, 1949. The capture of these cities and Communist campaigns in the area between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers caused a general withdrawal of Nationalist forces to the south bank of the Yangtze.

The Communists paused to regroup their troops, while talking peace with the Kuomintang, before resuming the offensive in late April. Taiyuan was taken on April 24, and the remaining cities held by the Nationalists in Shansi fell by early May, placing all North China within the Great Wall in Communist hands. North of the frontier barrier, western Suiyuan held out until September, when anti-Communist forces laid down their arms.

668 During the course of the North China campaign, popular opinion was increasingly hostile to the Kuomintang, when not sympathetic to the Communists. Red Army control of the countryside and disruption of communication routes prevented the Nationalist Government from solving the food and inflation crises in the cities. Its use of troops that had served the Japanese during the war, reinstatement of pre-war officials, and inability to control the reversion of soldiers and administrators to

III. CRIMINAL CODES AND LAWS GOVERNING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

669 The Communists' intention to compile a criminal and civil code was evidenced by the organization of the Commission on Codification under the Government Administration Council, which has since become the Bureau of Codification under the State Council. As yet, the commission has not published the results of its work. However, many decrees and orders concerning criminal offenses and counterrevolutionary activities have been issued by the Communist government.

A. Criminal Code

669 671 The decree promulgated by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China in December 1954 prescribed the procedures for arrest and detention of suspects.[39] As a result arrests are not made until they have been approved by the People's court or by the People's procurators. The decree also provides guarantees of individual rights -- against arbitrary search -- for a minimum period of detention, and an early trial. But in certain circumstances, public

39. Ibid., December 21, 1954, p. 1.

669 security agencies can make unauthorized arrests
671 and ignore the individual protections prescribed by law. This is especially true when dealing with "counterrevolutionaries." Persons who cannot establish their identities or have no fixed address are subject to immediate arrest.

687 To reveal security information and to
671 violate national currency laws are criminal acts, subject to severe punishment, according to a decree pertaining to the safekeeping of national security information [40] and a law concering national currency.[41] National security information includes not only military information but also any data concerning economic and financial affairs, transportation conditions, judicial and legislative matters. The term "national security information" is so loosely defined that unlawful disclosure of any information can be regarded as a criminal act. An act resulting in the violation of national currency regulations, if judged to have been committed with the intent of contributing to the success of counterrevolutionaries is tantamount to a counterrevolutionary act. Within the loose definitions of the

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40. Yangtze Daily, June 11, 1951, p. 1.

41. Ibid., April 18, 1951, p. 4.

687 law governing "corruption,"[42] passed during the
671 Three-Anti Campaign by the Government Administration Council, severe penalties are provided for "corruption" and bribery by a government employee or by a citizen in collaboration with a civil servant.

B. Decrees to Eliminate Counterrevolutionary Activities

•669 Any act deemed contrary to the interest
687 of the state is considered to be "counterrevolutionary." Persons placed by the government in the category of landlords, bandits, former Kuomintang officials, or members of secret societies have been branded automatically as counterrevolutionaries.

Although regulations governing the suppression and control of landlords in the North China Region are not available, the spirit and manner in which landlords are tried and placed under surveillance is the same in this region as in any other. Regulations governing the suppression of counterrevolutionaries,[43] issued by the Government Administration Council in February 1951, applied to all regions throughout the nation. This regulation is allegedly based on the spirit of Article 7 of the Common Program, which registered the determination of the Communist

42. People's Daily, April 22, 1952, p.1.

43. Liberation Daily, Feb. 23, 1951, p.1.

669 regime to imprison all counterrevolutionaries
687 and other "criminals" and to employ the method of "Reform-through-labor cultivate their loyalty to the Communist regime." Counterrevolutionaries are subject to trial both by the People's court and by military tribunal. They are deprived both of their political rights and personal property.

Two laws govern the control of counterrevolutionaries: the Law of Control of Counterrevolutionaries [44] and Regulations Governing Labor Service for Reform.[45] The first of these laws, issued by the Ministry of Public Security, provides prison terms for persons who conspired against the Communist regime but have not yet shown their loyalty to it. Decisions repeating their control are vested in the People's courts and the public security agencies at county and municipal levels. Hsiang and ch'ü governments and public security sub-stations in the city may initiate control, subject to the approval of the immediately superior office. Persons under surveillance are deprived of their political rights, including the right to vote. During the period of surveillance, lasting up to three years, counterrevolutionaries are compelled to engage in "productive" work. Former members of the

44. Ibid., March 18, 1951, p. 1.

45. People's Daily, Sept. 7, 1954, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 293, Sept. 15, 1954.

669
687 Kuomintang, the Chinese Youth Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party, former intelligence personnel under the Nationalist Government, and officers of that government above the rank of captain are required to register with public security agencies.

The Regulations Governing Labor Service for Reform, issued by the Government Administration Council in August 1954, provides a detailed scheme for the management of forced labor camps throughout China. The centralized management of forced labor under the public security agencies facilitates both the control and utilization of "counterrevolutionaries," while imposing on them severe hardships and cruelties.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion and from what we know of human reaction to totalitarianism, it would appear that the recent increase of criminal activities in the North China Region is traceable to the regime's excessive demands on the people and attempts to effect control by terror and strict surveillance. In a dictatorship, where a single will is imposed upon the people and force is the primary instrument of persuasion, resistance tends to increase as people become accustomed to the tactors of terrorism and inured to an atmosphere of vociferous domination.

However, public unrest has been less evident in the North China Region, which is under direct supervision of the Central People's Government, than in other regions of China.

669 Still, the renewed activities of secret societies
667 and the growing number of unsolved "criminal" cases constitute evidence of either the growing inefficiency of public security agencies or the improvement of evasive tactics on the part of the "criminal" element. That the situation has given the Communists cause for worry is evident in the statement of the Minister of Public Security to the National People's Congress in 1955 urging redoubled efforts to accomplish the complete suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

668 only to remnants of the Nationalist Government forces on the Mainland and the long-active bands of robbers. Since then, it has been used broadly to identify all anti-social and subversive groups.

727 669 Remnants of the Nationalist Government forces gave the Communists little trouble in the North China Region. Their organized resistance ceased as soon as peace was declared in the region after the capture of Peking on January 31, 1949. According to a Communist report, the surrender of the city by its Nationalist commander Fu Tso-i put out of action a quarter of a million Nationalist troops.[2] In the same month, a total of 628,000 troops went over to the Communists in the North China Region. About half of these captured soldiers were reorganized into Communist units,[3] and the rest were discharged and ordered to their homes. Many of the discharged troops who had not reached home before the complete conquest of the Mainland were recaptured. Non-natives of North China remaining in the region were detained for rehabilitation or forced labor. In Peking, an estimated 15,770 former Nationalist servicemen were arrested.[4]

2. Ti San-ts'u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chan-cheng [Brief Summary of the Third National Revolutionary War], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 140-41.

3. Ibid., p. 218.

4. Report of P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Jan. 31, 1950.

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669 723 After January 1949, Nationalist forces held out in the Taiyuan area of Shansi until May 1949, but most of the Nationalist units in the western part of Suiyuan accepted the Communist "reorganization" plan. The quick end of organized resistance in the North China Region not only released a large portion of the Communist forces for the offensive in Central-South China, but also made unnecessary an extermination campaign against Nationalist "bandits" in the North China Region.

A report issued by the North China Military Command at the beginning of 1950 triumphantly announced the extermination of all Nationalist troops and other "armed bandits."[5] Tasks assigned to the troops under the command of the North China Military Command were then centered on training and reorganization, assistance in agricultural production, and the strengthening of the local militia.

B. Landlords

423 After the Land Reform Movement in the North China Region, landlordism as a system of land ownership was largely eradicated. Some landlords died during the land reform period; others, including those sentenced to imprisonment for a year or less, were placed under the surveillance of public security agencies. The released landlords were given a piece of land

5. Ibid., January 9, 1950, p. 2.

668 Although the Communists optimistically declared the conclusion of the 1951 movement in the North China Region, counterrevolutionary activities did not cease after that year. Repeated warnings calling for suppression have been issued since 1954. The convention of the Second Session of the National People's Congress in July-August 1955 again affirmed the Communists' determination to renew the campaign against counterrevolutionaries. Shih Liang, Minister of Justice, reported in a speech to the Congress that the number of cases of counterrevolutionary activity was increasing.[13] During [674] 1954, counterrevolutionary cases constituted only 1.5 per cent of all criminal cases; in 1955 they were estimated at 4.8 per cent.

668 727 2. Former Nationalist Troops and Armed Resistance. The large-scale surrender of Nationalist troops in the North China Region eliminated many organized resistance groups. Either through imprisonment or reorganization, the Communists succeeded in establishing control over the large majority of former Nationalist servicemen. In Peking, in the year following the Communists' seizure of power, some 743 former Nationalist officials were arrested, 6,425 were forced to register, and 15,770 soldiers were placed in custody.[14]

• 669 Although organized resistance was not offered by Nationalist troops, their activities

13. Text of speech, ibid, July 30, 1955, p.6.
14. Ibid., Jan. 31, 1950, p. 1.

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669 did not entirely cease. Many former Nationalist soldiers accepted reorganization under Communist domination, but others found life extremely difficult under the new regime, especially as the Communist identified all ex-soldiers (Nationalist) as "potentially hostile" elements. Some of them did join with other discontented groups to plot organized resistance. Their influence upon various discontented groups is growing stronger, particularly among the peasants and within secret societies.

With respect to armed resistance in the North China Region, scattered reports are available to us. During the campaign against counterrevolutionaries in 1951, many units were identified by name.[15] A unit called the "Anti-Communist Allied Army" was uncovered in Hopei Province and accused of espionage and armed revolt. In December 1954, three additional resistance groups were reported in the same province.[16] Another unit was identified as the "Oppose the Communists, Reconstruct the State Army" which had been in existence since 1949 and was composed of ex-soldiers and former landlords. They were reported to have seized weapons from military units and used them in attacking Communist strongholds. In 1952-53, this unit was said to have been active in the counties of Ku-ting, An-kuo, and Wan-chüan, Hopei Province.

708 669 3. Nationalist Spies. Before the movement

15. Consult report of department head of Public Security, Hopei Province, Hopei Daily, March 31, 1951, p. 1.

16. People's Daily, June 12, 1954, p. 3.

708 for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries,
669 the Communist regime apparently concentrated on the exposure and extermination of Nationalist intelligence networks. In Peking, for example, within a period of nineteen months, 179 cases involving espionage were prosecuted.[17] Among the 1,565 intelligence workers arrested were reported to be representatives of practically every intelligence organization within the Nationalist Party. In Shihchiachuang, Hopei Province, the Communists announced the discovery of a major intelligence organization, the Kung-chiao Pao-kuo-t'uan, and charged it with engaging in espionage against the regime.[18] Of the organization's personnel captured, only a few were accused of being leaders; one of them was charged with executing 160 underground Communist Party members. The elimination of other Nationalist intelligence teams in cities and rural areas was announced at this time.

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668 Although the majority of former Nationalist intelligence woekres was arrested, Kuomintang officials and army officers above the rank of captain were placed under surveillance and required to register with public security agencies in 1951. At one time, 392 former intelligence workers and 3,430 Kuomintang Party members above the rank of ch'u secretary in Peking were placed under surveillance.[19]

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17. Hopei Daily, Oct. 2, 1950, p. 1.
18. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao (Yangtze Daily), Oct. 22, 1950, p. 4.
19. Hopei Daily, Oct. 21, 1950, p. 1.

668 687 regulations, to guard state property, to safeguard economic information, and to observe all safety and security regulations became the duties of every worker.

687 Despite the enforcement of all these measures, sabotage activities grew with the expansion of industry. The woman minister of justice Shih Liang revealed that there were a total of 364,604 sabotage cases throughout China between January 1954 and May 1955. The destruction of the Hsia Hua Yüan mining area in Hopei in 1955 was cited as a deliberate act of sabotage by counterrevolutionaries.[26] The total number of sabotage cases in Hopei Province in 1954 was reported[27] to be approximately 160 per cent above the number reported in 1953. In Shansi, in 1954, sabotage rate doubled in the course of a year.

D. Secret Societies

•669 575 The most widespread and persistent resistance to the Communist regime in the North China Region was offered by the secret societies. Secret societies, as rebellious organizations, have invariably represented the Chinese people's resistance to social change. Moreover, in a society such as exists in Communist China today, where the individual has lost all sense of identity, the appeal of secret societies which preach stoicism and indifference may be great, especially among the illiterate peasants and workers. For this reason, the Communists have singled out

26. Ibid., Jul.3,1955, p. 1.

27. Shih Liang's report ibid., Jul.30, 1955, p. 6.

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575 secret societies as one of the chief groups for suppression. Also, the Communists have charged some secret socieites with being agents for the Nationalists, claiming that society headquarters have been used as meeting places for gangsters, vagrants, and subversive groups plotting against the regime.

As early as June 1949, an order to outlaw secret societies was issued by the former North China People's Government. Many of the larger societies, including the I Kuan Tao, the Fo Chiao Hui, the Ta Fo Tao, the Sheng-Hsien Tao, the Ming Yen Tao, and the Hsien T'ien Tao, were outlawed. Among the secret societies existing in North China, some were identified as having nationwide organizations. As of June 1951, according to a Communist report, liason among certain secret societies had been established in all regions.[28] Secret societies in the Southwest China Region, for example, were reported to be receiving their instructions from various headquarters in Shansi Province.

The most active and widespread secret society was the I Kuan Tao,[29] which was formed in the province of Shantung in the 1920's. It expanded throughout the North China Region and was, according to the Communists, one of the most active espionage organizations employed

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28. Ibid., June 5, 1951, p. 3.

29. See Shih-shih Shou-ts'e [Current Affairs Handbook] No. 4, Dec. 1950, pp. 77-81; No. 6, Jan. 1951, pp. 38-43.

•669 575 by the Japanese to spy on the Communists during the war of resistance against Japan. The effort to eliminate the I Kuan Tao was concentrated in Shansi Province. In 1950 in Shansi, the I Kuan Tao was reported to have a following of 870,000, most of whom were peasants and working people.[30] In a village in Tai hsien in Shansi Province, peasants constituted 74 per cent of the 544 followers of the I Kuan Tao. During 1950, when the Communists were attempting to suppress the I Kuan Tao, the provincial government of Shansi issued orders to concentrate all available forces on the areas where the secret society had its greatest influence.[31] In the 734 villages selected, as many as 82,300 members of that organization were forced to resign; of this number, 1,692 were "leaders" and 133 were "priests" of the society.

Despite long and ruthless attempts at suppression, the activities of the I Kuan Tao have not diminished. There is evidence that the secret society is growing in power in the North China Region and that it has gained influence in other regions. In Kalgan, for instance, an administrative district in Hopei Province, some 36 cases involving the activities of secret societies[32] were brought to trial in 1955. The Communists reported that during

30. People's Daily, Dec. 23, 1950, p.3.
31. Ibid., Nov. 28, 1950, p. 1.
32. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], June 19, 1955, p. 1.

669 these raids they seized many secret meeting
575 places capable of holding several hundred people and that weapons and other implements intended for espionage purposes were confiscated. During 1951, at least one self-styled "emperor" and many officers were arrested.

668 Apart from the issuance of orders to
575 outlaw secret societies, their suppression involved mass participation in public meetings, at which evidence of crimes committed by the societies was displayed and people were urged to reveal knowledge of membership and the activities in which the societies were involved. Many leaders were captured as a result of these mass demonstrations. Another method employed by the Communists involved a concentrated attack upon all labor organizations suspected of being under the influence or control of the secret societies. The societies had acquired leadership of the labor groups in charge of wharves, railway stations, and wheelbarrow "transportation centers." To eliminate the power of the societies, the Communists launch a campaign to reorganize small transport firms into state-owned companies and to organize workers into Communist trade unions under the disciplined management of Party cadres.

668 II. CORRUPTION, WASTE, AND THEFT